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“Few Americans realize that some auction participants are siphoning off and storing 
“bidstream” data to compile exhaustive dossiers about them.  In turn, these dossiers  
are being openly sold to anyone with a credit card, including to hedge funds, 
political campaigns, and even to governments.” 
April 1, 2021 Letter to Google CEO Sundar Pichai from  
U.S. Senators Wyden, Cassidy, Gillibrand, Warner, Brown, and Warren1 
I. INTRODUCTION 2 
A. The Falsehood Presented by Google re Privacy 
1. This case is all about a persons’ privacy under laws of our state, country and 
common sense.   
2. Google repeatedly says that it values privacy and gives users control of their 
personal information. Google promises its hundreds of millions of users that it “will never sell 
any personal information to third parties” and “you get to decide how your information is 
used.”3 These promises are false. In fact, Google monitors its consumers’ digital footprint, then 
makes billions of dollars by selling their sensitive personal information. While Google lulls its 
users into a false sense of privacy, it continually and surreptitiously broadcasts its users’ 
sensitive personal information to third parties through its Real-Time Bidding (“RTB”) system.  
B. The Process of Google’s Privacy Violations 
3. RTB is the process by which the digital ads we see every day on the Internet  are 
curated. For each ad, an auction takes place milliseconds before it shows up in a users’ browser 
or in an mobile application. During this auction, hundreds of third parties receive sensitive 
 
1 See Exhibit 1 to this Complaint.  
2 Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.  The 
allegations pertaining to plaintiffs are based on personal knowledge, and the allegations 
pertaining to all other matters are based on information and belief, including investigations by 
counsel and information learned from Congressional hearings, administrative proceedings, 
academic research, Google’s website, and news reports. 
3 Pichai, Sundar (May 7, 2019), Google’s Sundar Pichai: Privacy Should Not Be a Luxury Good, 
The New York Times, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/opinion/google-sundar-
pichai-privacy.html 
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personal information about the potential recipient of the ad, including, but not limited to, their 
device identifiers and their cookies, detailed location data, IP addresses, browsing history, unique 
demographic and biometric information such as age and gender. All of these “bidders” receive 
this personal information which they can, and do, save and review, even though only one 
bidder—the auction winner—will use that information to deliver an advertisement to the 
consumer. 
4. Few Americans realize that Google is allowing so many companies to siphon off 
and store this highly personal “bidstream” data which is then sold by data brokers to hedge 
funds, political campaigns, and even to governments, both foreign and domestic.4  When 
compiled, these massive data sets operate like exhaustive dossiers on individual Americans. 
5. During its Real-Time Bidding auctions, Google solicits participants to bid on ad 
space targeted to the specific consumer (the “Consumer”).  To do so, Google provides highly 
specific information about the Consumer to all auction participants, including data that 
effectively identifies the Consumer being targeted through unique identifiers, device identifiers 
and IP addresses, among other information. All of this individualized information is called the 
“Bidstream Data.” 
6. In less than a blink of an eye, hundreds of recipients of the Consumer’s Bidstream 
Data submit bids to place an ad on the Consumer’s screen. Only one bidder will win the auction.  
However, all participants, even those who did not even submit a bid, are able to save, store and 
monetize the Consumer’s personal information. As Google is well-aware, many participants do 
not place bids and only participate to conduct surveillance and collect ever more detailed data 
points about millions of Google’s Consumers. Google benefits from this surveillance, as the 
higher number of bidders encourages higher bids, which increases the profitability of Google 
RTB auctions.  
 
4 Senator Ron Wyden (Oregon), et al. (July 31, 2020), Letter to Hon. Joseph J. Simmons, 
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) urging FTC investigation of RTB (“Wyden 
FTC Letter”) available at 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/073120%20Wyden%20Cassidy%20Led%20FT
C%20Investigation%20letter.pdf and attached as Ex 1 to this Complaint 
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C. The Scale of Google’s Privacy Violations 
7. Google’s RTB auction process is the most extensive in the world and the resulting 
targeted advertising is the primary source of Google’s over One Hundred and Fifty Billion 
Dollars (>$150,000,000,000) in annual revenues. Google’s position as one of the world’s most 
pervasive technology companies, has given it unique access to the intimate details of each 
Consumer’s habits and preferences.  Google’s extensive access to consumer data is facilitated by 
its various (and often seemingly free) consumer products, including the ubiquitous Google.com 
search engine, Google Maps, the Chrome web-browser, Gmail, YouTube, Android, Google 
Documents, Google Drive, Google Calendars, Google Flights, Google Fit, Google Pay, etc.  
Each of these products provides Google with an opportunity to gather detailed personal 
information about its consumers as they engage online in real-time. 
8. Google’s purpose is to build massive repositories of the most current information 
available about the people using its services to sell it to Google’s partners. Google secretly 
collects and analyzes real-time information about everyone engaging on those platforms and on 
third-party platforms through services such as Google Analytics. This results in Google 
collecting and selling information about activity users could not expect to be sold. But because 
transparency about those practices would lead to less user engagement on those platforms, which 
in turn would impede its ability to maximize targeted ad revenues, Google does not disclose 
these practices to its account holders. 
D. Google’s Continuing False Promises Regarding Privacy 
9. This pervasive collection and use of its consumers’ personal information 
contradicts Google’s promises of user privacy and control. Any consumer can sign up for a 
Google Account by clicking a button assenting to the TOS Google has unilaterally drafted which 
falsely promises consumers: 
 “We don’t sell your personal information to anyone.”5 
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 “Advertisers do not pay us for personal information.”7 
 “We also never use … sensitive information like race, religion, or 
sexual orientation, to personalize ads to you.”8 
 “We don’t show you personalized ads based on sensitive categories, 
such as race, religion, sexual orientation, or health.”9 
 “You get to decide how your information is used.”10 
11 
10. These representations are intentionally false. The Bidstream Data that Google 
sells and discloses to all Google RTB auction participants includes the Google Customer’s 
unique device identifier; his/her IP address and Google ID; his/her “User-Agent” information; 
the content of the webpage the Google customer is viewing; the “Publisher ID of the website; 
and so-called “vertical” information about the Google Customer’s interests that is associated 
with the bid that can include information relating to race, religion, health, and sexual orientation. 
  The vertical information is collected by Google over time and organized for each and every 
 
 
6Google Privacy Policy dated Feb. 4, 2021. 
7 Id. 
8 https://about.google/how-our-business-works/ 
9 Google Privacy Policy dated Feb. 4, 2021. 
10 Pichai, Sundar (May 7, 2019), Google’s Sundar Pichai: Privacy Should Not Be a Luxury 
Good, The New York Times, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/opinion/google-
sundar-pichai-privacy.html 
11 Your privacy is protected by responsible data practices, Google, 
https://safety.google/intl/en_us/privacy/data/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2021). 
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Google Customer by algorithm into thousands of consumer categories that identify the user’s 
personal habits, interests and preferences. 
11. As a result, in the blink of an eye, millions of times a day, Google  provides each 
and every RTB auction participant with a wealth of information about Google Customers, 
including the identity of the customer, their specific device, their specific location; the specific 
content of their communications; and highly sensitive information about race, religion, sexual 
orientation, and health.  
12. Google even provides RTB bidders with a service that helps them match up the 
Google Customer’s current Bidstream Data with the library of information that the recipient has 
already collected regarding that Google Customer. 
13. The extensive and detailed nature of this personalized profile that is collected in 
real-time by Google about each of its customers, over time, is why Google is able to charge 
premium prices from Google RTB auction bidders for placing targeted ads related to each 
Google Customer’s activity on the Internet.  
14. All participants in Google RTB auctions including those who do not actually 
place bids, can save, store and use the Bidstream Data for each Google Customer. Once a Google 
Customer’s Bidstream Data is published by Google, the data is not recoverable. 
E. The Violations of both California and Federal Law 
15. Google adopts California law in its contract with Google Customers. The 
Bidstream Data provided by Google constitutes personal information under California law and 
the exchange of that data for participation in the auction constitutes a sale of that personal 
information.  Google’s sale of its customers’ personal information breaches its express promises 
and violates laws that prohibit the selling of users’ personal and highly sensitive information.   
16. Google’s RTB process is largely unseen and unknown to Google Customers. 
Google does not disclose to its Google Customers its creation and use of massive data sets to 
profile them in these auctions, and it does not have Google Customers’ consent for such activity. 
The Bidstream Data information that is exchanged every second of every day in Google’s RTB 
auctions are not identified in any of Google’s voluminous pubic-facing policies and TOS. The 
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scale and success of Google’s RTB auction process is based on the fact that it is invisible to the 
millions of Google Customers whose personal and sensitive information is bought and sold every 
second of every day. 
17. But for Google’s deceptive practices concerning its collection and use of its 
customers’ personal information, users would have turned to other less-invasive options for 
browsing the Internet, Google’s customer base would have decreased, and fewer bidders would 
have participated in Google’s RTB auctions, which in turn would have decreased the massive 
profits Google derives from its hidden RTB auctions.  
18. Google’s blatant misdirection about user privacy is astonishing, but is part of 
Google’s general culture of disregard for users’ privacy, and is consistent with Google’s 
unscrupulous business practices.12 
19. Google’s practices affect millions of Americans who care about protecting their 
privacy. According to Google, more than 200 million people visit Google’s “Privacy Checkup” 
website each year. Each day, nearly 20 million people check their Google privacy settings. 
People do this because they care about their privacy and believe that they can “control” what 
Google shares (because Google has told them so). The truth is that Google “controls” how it uses 
consumer data, and its representations about consumer control are meaningless. 
F. Congressional Inquiry has not Stopped the Fraud 
20. This process has been the subject of Congressional inquiry. In July 2020, Senator 
Ron Wyden and nine other members of Congress wrote a letter to the Federal Trade Commission 
explaining the privacy dangers of RTB systems. The letter explained: “Americans never agreed 
to be tracked and have their sensitive information sold to anyone with a checkbook. … This 
outrageous  privacy violation must be stopped and the companies that are trafficking in 
 
12 Nicholas Kristof, With Help from Google, XVideos Lets People Leer at the Worst Moment in a 
Child’s Life, New York Times (April 16, 2021), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/16/opinion/sunday/companies-online-rape-videos.html 
(reporting on Google’s role in directing people to video footage of child sexual abuse: “Google is 
the primary means by which [‘porn tubes’] drive traffic to their sites”). 
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Americans’ illicitly obtained private data should be shut down.” 13 
21. On April 1, 2021, a bipartisan group comprised of U.S. Senators Wyden, Cassidy, 
Gillibrand, Warner, Brown, and Warren, sent letters to Google and other tech companies 
engaged in buying and selling targeted ads through RTB, demanding answers to questions 
concerning the continuous selling of personal consumer information to all comers, including 
foreign governments: 
 
Few Americans realize that some auction participants are 
siphoning off and storing “bidstream” data to compile 
exhaustive dossiers about them. In turn, these dossiers are 
being openly sold to anyone with a credit card, including to 
hedge funds, political campaigns, and even to governments. 
 
Over the past year, multiple reports have indicated that a 
number of federal agencies have purchased personal data 
derived from mobile apps and other online services, in ways 
that potentially merit closer scrutiny. But the United States is 
not the only government with the means and interest in 
acquiring Americans’ personal data. This information would 
be a goldmine for foreign intelligence services that could 
exploit it to inform and supercharge hacking, blackmail, and 
influence campaigns. As Congress debates potential federal 
privacy legislation, we must understand the serious national 
security risks posed by the unrestricted sale of Americans’ 
data to foreign companies and governments.14 
22. Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of themselves and all Google 
Customers in the United States who, by virtue of browsing on the Chrome browser, was subject 
to violations of privacy, and other violations of statutory, Constitutional and common law by 
having their personal information sold or otherwise disclosed by Google without their 
authorization.   
II. JURISDICTION 
23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims in this action. 
 
13 See Exhibit 2 to this Complaint, Wyden FTC Letter. 
14 See April 1, 2021 letter to Sundar Pichai; Exhibit 1 to the Complaint, and available at 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/040121%20Wyden%20led%20Bidstream%20Let
ter%20to%20Google.pdf 
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This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Class Action Fairness 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because this is a class action in which the amount in controversy 
exceeds $5,000,000, and at least one member of the class is a citizen of a state other than the 
state in which Google maintains its headquarters (California).  
24. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the state law claims arise out of the same case or 
controversy as those that give rise to the federal claims. 
25. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Google LLC (“Defendant” or 
“Google”) because it is headquartered in this District. Google concedes to personal jurisdiction 
in its current and prior Google TOS.15 
26. This District is the correct venue because Google is headquartered in this District 
and because its TOS provides that Plaintiffs resolve disputes in this District.  
27. Assignment of this case to the San Jose Division is correct because a substantial 
part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in Santa Clara County, 
California.  See Civil Local Rule 3-2(c)(e) 
III. PARTIES 
28. Plaintiff Meaghan Delahunty is a citizen of California. Delahunty is a Google 
Customer who uses the Internet, including websites from which Google sold and shared Google 
Customer information without authorization, as alleged herein. Delahunty uses the Chrome web 
browser, including to search for and watch audio-visual materials. In order to become a Google 
Customer, Delahunty was required to indicate she agreed to Google’s contractual terms and 
conditions. On information and belief, unbeknownst to Delahunty at the time, Google sold and 
shared her personal information in Google RTB auctions on thousands of occasions over the 
years to thousands of unknown auction participants. 
29. Plaintiff Meghan Cornelius is a citizen of Texas. Cornelius is a Google Customer 
who uses the Internet, including websites from which Google sold and shared Google Customer 
 
15 See Google Terms of Service dated Apr. 14, 2014, Oct. 25, 2017, and Mar. 31, 2020. 
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information without authorization, as alleged herein. Cornelius uses the Chrome web browser, 
including to search for and watch audio-visual materials. In order to become a Google Customer, 
Cornelius was required to indicate she agreed to Google’s contractual terms and conditions.  On 
information and belief, unbeknownst to Cornelius at the time, Google sold and shared her 
personal information in Google RTB auctions on thousands of occasions over the years to 
thousands of unknown auction participants. 
30. Plaintiff John Kevranian is a citizen of California. Kevranian is a Google 
Customer who uses the Internet, including websites from which Google sold and shared Google 
Customer information without authorization, as alleged herein. Kevranian uses the Chrome web 
browser, including to search for and watch audio-visual materials. In order to become a Google 
Customer, Kevranian was required to indicate he agreed to Google’s contractual terms and 
conditions. On information and belief, unbeknownst to Kevranian at the time, Google sold and 
shared his personal information in Google RTB auctions on thousands of occasions over the 
years to thousands of unknown auction participants. 
31. Because of the ubiquity of Google’s advertising services to businesses and its 
surveillance technologies, it is practically impossible for any American to use the Internet 
without their personal information being subject to Google RTB.  
32. On information and belief, Google has sold and shared the personal information 
of Plaintiffs and tens of millions of other Americans in Google RTB auctions on countless 
occasions over the years to unknown auction participants, including information about the audio-
visual materials they requested, obtained and watched on the Chrome browser which was sold 
and shared in Google’s RTB auctions without express written consent. 
33. Google is a limited liability company headquartered in Mountain View, 
California. Google is owned by Alphabet Inc., a publicly traded company headquartered in 
Mountain View, California. Alphabet trades under the stock trading symbols GOOG and 
GOOGL. Alphabet’s revenues are primarily due to Google’s delivery of targeted advertising that 
is driven by Google’s RTB auction process. Google engages in, and its activities substantially 
affect, interstate trade and commerce. Google provides a range of products and services that are 
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marketed, distributed, and offered to consumers throughout the United States.  
IV. FACTS 
G. Google Falsely Represents That It Protects Its Customers’ Privacy 
34. According to Pew Research Center nearly all Americans believe it is important to 
be “in control of who can get information” about them; to not be tracked without their consent; 
and to be in “control[] of what information is collected about [them].”16 
35. Google’s own researchers have confirmed that consumers are more likely to trust 
a company when the consumers believe they have control over how the company uses their 
information.  In 2016, Google researcher Martin Ortlieb published a research paper titled 
“Sensitivity of personal data items in different online contexts,”17 and other Google researchers 
have since explained the need for transparency regarding how user information is handled.18 
Google researchers have explained that when users are more likely to freely share their 
information when trust is established and they believe they are in control of whether and how 
their personal information is being used; it’s a matter of trust.19 
36. To instill trust, Google repeatedly has held itself out as a champion of Internet 
privacy. For example, on June 6, 2016, a coalition of technology companies and privacy 
advocates united to oppose Congressional efforts to expand government surveillance of online by 
signing a joint letter with the ACLU, Amnesty International and other NGOs, taking the position 
that online surveillance without court oversight raises “civil liberties and human rights concerns” 




17 Martin Ortlieb and Ryan Garner, Sensitivity of personal data items in different online 
contexts, De Gruyter Oldenbourg (June 3, 2016) available at 
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/itit-2016-0016/html (Last Visited Apr. 26, 
2021). 
18 Igor Bilogrevic and Martin Ortlieb, “If You Put All The Pieces Together…” – Attitudes 
Towards Data Combination and Sharing Across Services and Companies, CHI Conference 
on Human Factors in Computing Systems (May 2016), available at 
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2858036.2858432 (Last Visited Apr. 26, 2021). 
19 Martin Ortlieb, et al., Trust, Transparency & Control in Inferred User Interest Models, 
CHI Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (April 2014). 
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life” that would include “browsing history, email metadata, location information, and the exact 
date and time a person signs in or out of a particular online account” which would “reveal details 
about a person’s political affiliation, medical conditions, religion, substance abuse history, sexual 
orientation” and even physical movements.20 
37. Google also stated that beginning in August 2020, it would restrict advertising for 
“products or services that are marketed or targeted with the express purpose of tracking or 
monitoring another person or their activities without their authorization,” because such 
nonconsensual surveillance of “browsing history” is “dishonest behavior.”21 
38. Google’s recognition of the value of trust on the issue of Internet privacy 
underscores its awareness of the materiality of its repeated false statements and omissions which 
give Google customers a false impression of safety and control over their data.  
39. Google represents: “When you use our services, you’re trusting us with your 
information. We understand this is a big responsibility and work hard to protect your 
information[.]”22 
40. On December 11, 2018, Google CEO Sundar Pichai testified before Congress 
and repeated Google’s promise, “We do not and would never sell consumer  data.”23  
41. On May 7, 2019, Pichai published an opinion piece in the New York Times, 
stating: “To make privacy real, we give you clear, meaningful choices around your data. 
All while staying true to two unequivocal policies: that Google will never sell any 
personal information to third parties; and that you get to decide how your information is 
 




21 https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/9726908?hl=en&ref topic=29265 (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2021) 
22 E.g., Google Privacy Policy dated May 25, 2018; Google Privacy Policy dated Dec. 19, 2019; 
Google Privacy Policy dated Feb. 4, 2021. 
23 See Google CEO Sundar Pichai Testifies Before the House Judiciary Committee. December 
11, 2018. Available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?455607-1/google-ceo-sundar-pichai-
testifies- data-privacy-bias-concerns# (at 1:33:51). 
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42. On October 28, 2020, during his testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, Pichai stated: “Privacy is one of the most important 
areas we invest in as a company. Have thousands of engineers working on it. We believe 
in giving users control, choice, and transparency. And anytime we associate data with 
users, we are transparent.” 
43. Google makes these promises and public statements regarding the use of Google 
Customers’ personal information to create trust, increase user engagement and increase revenue 
for Google. Higher user engagement means more revenue in that moment for Google (and also 
more data about the users that can lead to more revenue). By promising more privacy, and failing 
to deliver on those promises, Google fraudulently induces more data sharing. 
H. Google’s History of Privacy Violations & Its Agreement with the Federal 
Trade Commission 
44. Despite its professed commitment to Internet privacy, Google has violated Google 
Customer’s privacy rights and trust for years.  
45. In 2010, the FTC charged that Google “used deceptive tactics and violated its own 
privacy promises to consumers when it launched its social network, Google Buzz.” To settle the 
matter, the FTC barred Google “from future privacy misrepresentations” and required Google 
“to implement a comprehensive privacy program.”25 
46. In 2011, Google entered into a consent decree with the FTC (the “Consent 
Decree”), effective for 20 years, in which the FTC required and Google agreed as follows 
(emphasis added): 
 
IT IS ORDERED that [Google], in or affecting commerce, 
shall not misrepresent in any manner, expressly or by 
implication: A. the extent to which [Google] maintains and 
 
24 Pichai, Sundar (May 7, 2019), Google’s Sundar Pichai: Privacy Should Not Be a Luxury 
Good, The New York Times, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/opinion/google-
sundar-pichai-privacy.html 
25  https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-charges-deceptive-privacy-
practices-googles-rollout-its-buzz (last visited Apr. 22, 2021). 
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protects the privacy and confidentiality of any covered 
information, including, but not limited to, misrepresentations 
related to: (1) the purposes for which it collects and uses 
covered information, and (2) the extent to which consumers 
may exercise control over the collection, use, or disclosure of 
covered information.26 
47. This requirement applies to the Google conduct at issue in this lawsuit, as the 
Consent Decree broadly defines “covered information” to include information Google “collects 
from or about an individual” including a “persistent identifier, such as IP address,” and 
combinations of additional data with the same. 
48. Just one year after the Consent Decree was entered, the FTC found that Google 
had already violated the Consent Decree, by way of Google’s misrepresentations regarding what 
consumer data it would and would not collect with the Safari web browser. In an August 2012 
press release, the FTC explained: 
 
Google Inc. has agreed to pay a record $22.5 million civil 
penalty to settle Federal Trade Commission charges that it 
misrepresented to users of Apple Inc.’s Safari Internet browser 
that it would not place tracking “cookies” or serve targeted ads 
to those users, violating an earlier privacy settlement between 
the company and the FTC.  
 
The settlement is part of the FTC’s ongoing efforts make sure 
companies live up to the privacy promises they make to 
consumers, and is the largest penalty the agency has ever 
obtained for a violation of a Commission order. In addition to 
the civil penalty, the order also requires Google to disable all 
the tracking cookies it had said it would not place on 
consumers’ computers.27 
 
49. Since 2012, a number of federal, state, and international regulators have similarly 
accused Google of violating its promises to consumers on what data it would and would not 




df (last visited Apr. 22, 2021). 
27  https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-settle-
ftc-charges-it-misrepresented (last visited Apr. 22, 2021). 
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50. In September 2016, when Google updated its browser app for Apple iOS, Google 
wrote that users would have “[m]ore control with incognito mode” and “Your searches are your 
business. That’s why we’ve added the ability to search privately with incognito mode in the 
Google app for iOS. When you have incognito mode turned on in your settings, your search and 
browsing history will not be saved.”28 Similarly, in May 2018, Google modified its privacy 
policy to state, “[y]ou can use our services in a variety of ways to manage your privacy. . . . You 
can also choose to browse the web privately using Chrome in Incognito mode.”29 
51. Google made no statements about how users’ privacy would actually be limited in 
these private browsing sessions and avoided disclosing that users’ information was being 
collected while they are in private browsing mode through means that include Google Analytics, 
Google fingerprinting techniques, concurrent Google applications and processes on a consumer’s 
device and Google’s Ad Manager. 
52. In 2019, Google and YouTube agreed to pay $170 million to settle allegations by 
the Federal Trade Commission and the New York Attorney General that YouTube video sharing 
services illegally collected personal information from children without their parents’ consent. 
53. Then, in June 2020, France’s Highest Administrative Court upheld a 50 million 
Euro fine against Google based on its failure to provide clear notice and obtain users’ valid 
consent to process their personal data for ad personalization purposes. 
54. There is currently an ongoing proceeding by the Arizona Attorney General 
alleging Google failed to obtain consent regarding its collection of location data and its decision 
to combine certain user data.  In the Arizona Attorney General action, Google has produced 
documents establishing “overwhelming” evidence that “Google has known that the user 
experience they designed misleads and deceives users.” 
 
28 https://www.googblogs.com/the-latest-updates-and-improvements-for-the-google-app-for-ios/ 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2021). 
29 https://policies.google.com/privacy/archive/20171218-20180525?hl=en-US (last visited Apr. 
22, 2021). 
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55. Google’s employees made numerous admissions in internal communications, 
recognizing that Google’s privacy disclosures are a “mess” with regards to obtaining “consent” 
for its data collection practices and other issues relevant in this lawsuit.  
 
 “Do users with significant privacy concerns understand what data we are 
saving?”  
 
 “[T]ake a look at [redacted by Google] – work in progress, trying to rein in the 
overall mess that we have with regards to data collection, consent, and storage.” 
 
 “[A] bunch of other stuff that’s super messy. And it’s a Critical User Journey to 
make sense out of this mess.” 
56. Those internal documents, which are heavily redacted, demonstrate that Google 
employees have voiced their view that Google in fact does not inform Google Customers and 
Google Customers have not provided informed consent about how their information is collected 
and used by Google. 
57. And most recently, Australia’s federal court is reported to have concluded that 
Google misled consumers about personal data collected through Android mobile devices. The 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, a regulator, reportedly will seek a penalty in 
the “many millions.”30 
I. Google Promises That It Doesn’t Sell Customers’ Personal Information  
58. To access many of Google’s products a Google Customer must open a Google 
Account.31 To open a Google Account the Google Customer must indicate they agree to 
Google’s Terms of Service (“TOS”).32  
59. The TOS designates California law as governing law and Google is bound by 
California’s definition of the term “personal information.” Under California law personal 
 
30 https://www.reuters.com/technology/australia-finds-google-misled-customers-over-data-
collection-regulator-2021-04-16/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2021). 
31 Google Account Help, Create A Google Account, 
https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/27441?hl=en&ref topic=3382296. (last visited Apr. 
21, 2021). 
32  Though the Terms of Service at issue are materially identical throughout the Class Period, the manner 
by which they were presented to persons creating a Google Account shifted slightly over the relevant time 
period. All versions of the Terms of Service contain the following assertions material to the claims 
asserted herein. 
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information is “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being 
associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer 
or household.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(v)(1).   
1. The Privacy Policy Provided Personal Information Was Not Shared or Sold 
60. Google Customers who created a Google Account prior to around May 2018 were 
required to agree to both the TOS and the Google Privacy Policy (the “Privacy Policy”). 
61. The Privacy Policy made promises to Google Customers throughout the Class 
Period regarding the protection of their personal information. 
62. The Privacy Policy tracks the California Statutory definition of “personal 
information,” defining it as “information that you provide to us which personally identifies you, 
such as your name, email address, or billing information, or other data that can be reasonably 
linked to such information by Google, such as information we associate with Google Account.”33   
63. The Privacy Policy describes the information it associates with Google Accounts, 
i.e. “personal information,” to include the following:  
 
The information we collect includes unique identifiers, browser 
type and settings, device type and settings, operating system, 
mobile network information including carrier name and phone 
number and application version number. We also collect 
information about the interaction of your apps, browsers, and 
devices with our services, including IP address, crash reports, 
system activity and the date, time, and referrer URL at your 
request.34 
64. The document at the “unique identifiers” hyperlink defines a unique identifier as 
“a string of characters that can be used to uniquely identify a browser, app, or device,” which 
includes cookies, advertising ids and other unique device identifiers.35 
65. Google associates these unique identifiers—cookies, IP addresses, User-Agent 
information, advertising IDs, other unique device identifiers, and browsing history information—
with individual accounts that include names, email addresses, geolocation, and all other 
 
33 See Google Privacy Policy dated Dec. 19, 2019. 
34 See, e.g., id.  
35 See, e.g., id.  
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information Google maintains on individual account holders. 
66. But Google expressly assures Google Customers that personal information will 
not be shared with third parties without Google Customers’ consent. Specifically, the Privacy 
Policy makes promises that Google doesn’t share information that personally identifies you with 
advertisers; 36 and that it doesn’t share the Google Customers’ personal information with 
companies except with their consent. 37  Google has also promised that it doesn’t show Google 
Customers personalized ads based on sensitive categories, such as race, religion, sexual 
orientation, or health.”38  
67. Where the Privacy Policy mentions sharing information with “partners,” it 
emphasizes and promises that the information shared is not personally identifiable.39 
68. But that provision is misleading.  First, it describes “non-personally identifiable 
information” as “information that is recorded about users so that it no longer reflects or 
references an individually-identifiable user;”40  a definition that conflicts with California law and 
with Google’s own statement that the data associated with individual Google Customers is 
“personal information,” regardless of whether it “no longer reflects or references an individual 
user.”41  
69. Second, Google expressly limits collection of “information from your browser or 
device for advertising and measurement purposes” to “specific partners” listed in a hyperlink and 
promises that such information is limited to “non-personally identifiable information.”42 The 
hyperlink repeats the false promise that: “We don’t share information that personally identifies 
 
36 E.g., Google Privacy Policy dated May 25, 2018 at 5; Google Privacy Policy dated Dec. 19, 
2019. 
37 E.g., Google Privacy Policy dated June 28, 2016 at 6; Google Privacy Policy dated Dec. 19, 
2019. 
38 E.g., Google Privacy Policy dated May 25, 2018 at 5; Google Privacy Policy dated Dec. 19, 
2019. 
39 E.g., Id. 
40 E.g., Id. 
41 E.g., Id. 
42 Who are Google’s Partners?, Google, https://policies.google.com/privacy/google-partners 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2021). 
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you with our advertising partners[.]”43  
2. Terms of Service from May 2018 to the Present 
70. Google Customers who created a Google Account from around May 2018 to 
present, were required to agree only to the TOS. While Google Customers were not required to 
agree to the Privacy Policy during this period, creating a Google Account included a link to the 
Privacy Policy to show how Google would “process your information.”44 The Privacy Policy 
during this time contained repeated promises regarding how Google would use Google 
Customers’ information. 
71. While the TOS refers to the Privacy Policy, from March 31, 2020 to present, the 
TOS also states that the Privacy Policy is “not part of these terms.”45  During this period, the 
TOS incorporated a hyperlink to the “How our business works” webpage.  
72. The TOS, since March 31, 2020,  have stated, “You have no obligation to provide 
any content to our services and you’re free to choose the content that you want to provide.”46  
73. In the TOS, the reference and hyperlink: to “the way Google's business works” 
takes the Google Customer to Google’s “How our business works” page, thereby incorporating 
that linked document into the TOS. On the very first page of that linked document, Google 
declares in large type: “We don’t sell your personal information to anyone.” 
Google also states, “[W]e never sell your personal information to anyone[.]”47 
74. The “How our business works” page further promises: “Advertisers do not pay 
us for personal information[.]”; “[W]e never share that information with advertisers, unless you 
ask us to.”; “We also never use your emails, documents, photos, or sensitive information like 
race, religion, or sexual orientation, to personalize ads to you.” “We share reports with our 
advertisers to help them understand the performance of their ads, but we do so without revealing 
any of your personal information.” “At every point in the process of showing you ads, we keep 
 
43 Id.  
44 See, e.g., Tom Leeman, How to create a Google Account, YouTube (Feb. 2, 2020) 
https://youtu.be/ArZpwBl_z10 (at 4:40-4:45). 
45 See Google Terms of Service dated Mar. 31, 2020. 
46 See Google Terms of Service dated Mar. 31, 2020. 
47 https://about.google/how-our-business-works/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2021) 
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your personal information protected with industry-leading security technologies.” 48 
75. In addition to the promises made in contractual documents of Google’s TOS 
and Privacy Policy, Google has made other similar misrepresentations on its website in the 
“Who are Google’s Partners” webpage; the Google Personalized Advertising webpage, the 
“We do not Sell your personal information to anyone” webpage, and the “Your privacy is 
protected by responsible data practices” webpage. These representations all pertain to 
Google’s repeated false promise that it doesn’t share information that personally identifies 
the Google Customer with their advertising partners. 
76. Finally, Google collects Google Customers’ personal information under false 
pretenses.  Google promises Google Chrome users that they “don’t need to provide any 
personal information to use Chrome” and that “[t]he personal information that Chrome 
stores won’t be sent to Google unless you choose to store that data in your Google Account 
by turning on sync[.]”49 Despite these promises, regardless of whether or not a Google 
Customer elects to synchronize their Google account and Google Chrome, Google Chrome 
sends Google Customers’ personal information to Google, which information is then sold in 
Google’s RTB auction process. 
J. Google Real-Time Bidding is Hidden to Google Customers  
77. The Google Ad Exchange is a digital auction house that provides a platform for 
placing targeted ads on users’ web browsers and devices. Through the Google’s RTB auctions on 
its Ad Exchange, Google shares and sells Google Customers’ personal information with Google 
RTB auction participants to solicit bids for the right to display a real-time. The Google RTB 
auction ad exchange is the largest in the world, estimated to be responsible to 53 percent of all 
RTB transactions globally. 
78. Google’s RTB auction process is misleadingly disclosed and otherwise hidden to 
Google Customers. It is called real time bidding because it occurs almost instantaneously.  It is 
 
48 Id. 
49 Google Chrome Privacy Notice; available at: https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/ (last 
visited May 4, 2021). 
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an automated system that is invisible to Google Customers, which repeated sells their personal 
information to hundreds of participants. 
79. The information about Google Customers passes through a complex series of 
layers of demand-side platform and supply-side platforms in what is referred to as an “Ad Stack” 
as the data published by Google to numerous third parties. The Ad Stack proceeds as follows. 
First, the publisher is the website that has ad space to sell. Second, the supply side platform 
(“SSP”) is a separate entity that collects the Google Customer information to sell and the 
information about the ad space to be filled. Third, the ad exchange organizes the auctions 
between buyer and seller. Fourth, the demand-side platform (“DSP”) submits bids on behalf of 
advertisers for the ad space. Finally, fifth the advertiser purchases ads targeted to specific Google 
Customers.  Google controls the Ad Stack in Google RTB auctions because Google controls 
significant players at the SSP, ad exchange, and DSP layers of the Ad Stack. 
80. An example illustrates the process.  Medical Website reserves advertising space 
on its web pages to sell through Google RTB. A Google Customer looks for a specific page, in 
this example an article on Medical Website on breast cancer, by entering the web address in the 
navigation bar of his or her web browser and hits “enter.” This triggers the web browser to send 
a request to Medical Website, which, in turn, responds by displaying the Medical Website article 
on the Google Customer’s browser or device. As internet users are accustomed to, the requested 
webpage will display in a matter of seconds. But the Google Customer is unaware that the 
request to view the Medical Website article on breast cancer is also accompanied by a “cookie,” 
which is sent from the Google Customer’s web browser to the SSP which collects that and other 
Google Customer information to sell ad space for advertising associated with and on that 
Medical Website page.  
81. If the SSP is AdMob (i.e., “Advertising on Mobile”), an entity which is owned by 
Google, Google/AdMob matches the cookie to the Google Customer’s personal information 
stored by Google. Due to its immense storage of individual personal information, 
Google/AdMob has a practically unlimited ability to connect cookies to personal information. 
From its vast data set on each Google Customer, Google creates a Bid Request – containing the 
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Google Customer’s personal information and the content of the specific article that is the subject 
of the Google Customer’s interest. This Bid Request is then sent to DSP participants of the 
Google RTB auction (DSPs bid on behalf of advertisers). All Google RTB auction participants 
can review, save and use the personal information in the Bid Request. Bids are submitted and the 
highest bidder wins the bid and places its ad on Medical Website’s webpage containing the 
breast cancer article which the Google Customer is viewing. This process will repeat every time 
the user clicks another hyperlink to continue her research on breast cancer; resulting in ever more 
personal information exchanged on Google’s RTB auction. 
 
1. How Google Customers’ Personal Information is Shared on the RTB Auction 
82. The personal information about a Google Customer is the key item for sale based 
on the order in which the re-directed data is provided from Google to the bidders:50  Under the 
RTB, data is shared under the following categories, according to Google:  
 “[I]nformation that we know about the user,” which includes, among other things, IP 
address, Google ID, and user verticals; 
 “[I]nformation that we know about the webpage or mobile app,” which includes, among 
other things, publisher ID, detected verticals, vertical weight, and content labels; 
 Auction information, including a unique ID for the overall query, and the type of auction 
that will be run for this query; 
 “Information about the device,” which includes, among other things, the type (e.g., 
phone, desktop, tablet), platform (e.g., Android, iPhone), brand, model, and operating 
system; 
 “Information for ad queries coming from mobile devices,” which includes, among other 
things, whether the request is coming from a smartphone or tablet, and information about 
the mobile app. 
83. “Vertical” information is also transmitted by Google to define that Google 
 
50 https://developers.google.com/authorized-buyers/rtb/downloads/realtime-bidding-proto 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2021). 
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Customer’s advertising segment, including, but not limited to, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, and 
health conditions. This “vertical” information, which is made up of the personal information 
Google has persistently collected on each individual Google Customer, constitutes personal 
information under both California law and Google’s express policies.  The information shared by 
Google through its RTB auction is personal information that is reasonably capable of being 
associated, or that could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer 
or household. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(o)(1). In fact, bidders routinely associate this personal 
information with the consumer it describes so intimately.  Google’s unlawful dissemination and 
sale of this highly personal vertical information violates its privacy promises, and constitutes an 
invasion of Google Customers’ reasonable expectation of privacy and right to privacy. 
2. Google’s Disclosures Are Personally Identifiable to RTB Participants 
84. Google represents that any information it has collected about a Google Customer 
is “anonymized” and that it is shared to “just a few partners.”  In fact, unique identifiers allow 
RTB auction participants to match the personal information that Google transactionally shares 
with their own information.  This results in increasingly large dossiers on each individual Google 
Customer.  RTB participants are also able to infer sensitive verticals about an individual based 
on their web activity, where they are located and what they purchase, which is provided by 
Google.   
85. Google allows the disclosure of personally identifiable information to RTB 
auction participants in two ways.  First, Google provides publishers with personal information 
that they use to specifically identify the Google Customer for the purpose of bidding on an ad in 
Google’s Ad Exchange.  This is to say, Google provides personal information to an advertiser 
who bid on an ad in the ad exchange.  
86. Second, whether or not advertiser submits a winning bid, participating in the 
auction facilitates the acquisition and retention of Google Customers’ personal information that 
Google RTB participants use to create or continuously update and augment their own existing 
user data troves. 
87.  Third , Google assists Google RTB auction participants to connect Google 
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Customer personal information made available in a Bid Request to the information those 
participants already have about specific individuals through a “cookie matching service.” 
“Cookie matching enables Google RTB participants to match their own cookie—for example, an 
ID for a user that browsed your website—with a corresponding bidder-specific Google User ID, 
and construct user lists that can help the bidder make more effective bidding choices.51  
88. Even though Google Customers are told that the Google ID is anonymous, 
through cookie matching, whenever the Google Customer also has an account id with the auction 
participant, cookie matching enables that participant to tie the personal information from Google 
RTB together with data it already has to enhance its profile of the Google Customer. 
89. Google promotes the construction of  “user lists” that enable Google RTB auction 
participants to identify specific Google Customers  even when the Google Customer has taken 
steps to avoid Google’s tracking of the activity. Google “recommend[s] that bidders instead store 
and look up list ids using either google user id or hosted match data as keys.”52 
90. Google facilitates the identification of individual Google Customers through its 
cookie matching service which “allows one to populate user lists”53  and enables the bidder to 
match their cookies with Google’s, such that they can determine whether an impression sent in a 
bid request is associated with one of users being targeted.”54   
91. Through Google’s use of cookie matching, Google RTB auction participants are 
provided with personal information which can be and is used build detailed individual user 
profiles regarding Google Customers based on their browsing history. 
3. Companies Buy and Google Sells Google Customers’ Personal Information 
92. The Ad Exchange is an opaque system that is not known to Google Customers.  It 
exists in a virtual space, and not in a physical auction room. Google does not tell Google 
Customers which companies are bidding on their personal information, and therefore accessing, 
 
51 Cookie Matching, https://developers.google.com/authorized-buyers/rtb/cookie-guide. (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2021). 
52 Real-Time Bidding Protocol Buffer v.203,https://developers.google.com/authorized-
buyers/rtb/downloads/realtime-bidding-proto (last visited Apr. 22, 2021). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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their personal information, and which companies are winning the RTB auctions.  Google 
disclose potions of this information to hundreds of Google RTB auction participants. 
93. Google is not required under U.S. law to publish such information to American 
consumers. This information was reportedly obtained by the creation and deployment of web-
crawling scripts.  
94. However, other data protection jurisdictions do require some transparency into 
who is buying Google Customers’ personal information. Disclosures and reports from those 
other jurisdictions indicate that the current reports and allegations regarding Google in the U.S. 
may dramatically underestimate participation in Google RTB and the number of entities to which 
Google sells Google Customers’ personal information. 
95. The European Union, for example, has different laws and requires Google to 
identify all companies with which it shares personal data in the European Economic Area. The 
published list includes 833 companies, including well-known companies like Amazon, 
Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft (LinkedIn), Netflix, Adobe, Oracle, Salesforce, and eBay, as well 
as hundreds of little-known companies.55 Similarly, a study submitted to the Irish Data 
Protection Commission estimated that an estimated 13.5 million websites participated in the 
Google RTB and 2,182 companies directly received Google RTB data.56 
96. As stated in one complaint to the EU’s Data Protection Commission, real-time 
bidding represents a “vast systematic data breach” that allows data brokers to “develop intimate 
profiles about us, our afflictions and interests” for sale.57 
97. On January 22, 2021, the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s Office 
announced that it was resuming its investigation into RTB, stating: “The complex system of RTB 
can use people’s sensitive personal data to serve adverts and requires people’s explicit consent, 
which is not happening right now. . . . Sharing people’s data with potentially hundreds of 
 
55 https://support.google.com/admanager/answer/9012903?hl=en (last visited Apr. 22, 2021) 
56 Dr. Johnny Ryan, Submission to the Irish Data Protection Commission, Irish Council 
for Civil  Liberties (Sept. 21, 2020) https://www.iccl.ie/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/1.-
Submission-to-Data-Protection-Commissioner.pdf at 16-17. 
57 See https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/data-privacy-advocate-submits-further-
evidence-in-google-ads-inquiry-1.4359853 (last visited May 2, 2021). 
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companies, without properly assessing and addressing the risk of these counterparties, also raises 
questions around the security and retention of this data.”58 
98. Complaints filed with the Irish Data Protection Commission detail the categories of 
sensitive personal information published in Google’s RTB process, including political information, 
and health categories, such as “Substance abuse,” “Diabetes,” “Chronic Pain” “Sleep Disorders,” 
“AIDS & HIV,” “Incest & Abuse Support,” “Brain Tumor,” “Incontinence” and “Depression.”59 
4. Statute of Limitations is Tolled 
99. Google’s RTB process is hidden to the Plaintiffs and Google Customers. The 
Terms of Service does not inform Plaintiffs and Google Customers that Google’s advertising 
services discloses their personal information as alleged herein. Google continues to conceal this 
information.  
100. An average consumer could not reasonably be expected to know or understand 
how Google is using their data. The developer pages cited herein, while available on the web, are 
not easily understandable to the average person, and even those pages do not fully reveal the 
extent of Google’s actions. 
101. Plaintiffs were not aware of the factual bases for their claims for relief despite 
reasonable diligence. Thus, the statutes of limitation have been tolled by Google’s fraudulent 
concealment and denial of the facts alleged herein through the time period relevant to this action. 
K. Google has been wrongly enriched by its conduct 
102. Google’s monetizes the value of Internet users’ personal information. This is 
reflected by Google’s advertisement revenue. Google reported $146.9 billion in advertising 
revenue in 2020, $134.8 billion in 2019, $116.3 billion in 2018, $95.4 billion in 2017, and $79.4 
billion in 2016.60 This translates to 83% of Google’s total revenues in 2019, 85% in 2018, 86% 
 
58See ICO Statement, Adtech investigation resumes; available at: https://ico.org.uk/ about-the-ico 
/news-and -events/news-and-blogs/2021/01/adtech-investigation-resumes/ (last visited 5.5.21) 
59 See TechCrunch, Ireland’s data watchdog slammed for letting adtech carry on ‘biggest breach 
of all time’ available at: https://techcrunch.com/2020/09/21/irelands-data-watchdog-slammed-
for-letting-adtech-carry-on-biggest-breach-of-all-time/ (last visited 5.5.21) 
60 2018 Annual Report, Alphabet Inc. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1652044/000165204419000004/goog10-kq42018.htm (hereinafter “2018 Annual Report”). 
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in 2017 and 88% in 2016.61 Some large portion of information collected and sold by Google is 
included in these revenue figures.  
103. Google’s data mining of Google Customers’ personal information has also helped 
the revenues of Google’s associates, which include ads placed through Google’s partnered ad 
exchanges. Google reported the following revenues from Google associate properties: $21.5 
billion in 2019, $20 billion in 2018, $17.6 billion in 2017, and $15.6 billion in 2016.62 Google 
reports “strength in both AdMob and AdManager” primarily led to the $2.4 billion increase in 
Google associate properties revenues from 2017 to 2018.63 
104. Advertising auctions confirm that the personal information Google sells to RTB 
participants has economic value. The value of Americans’ personal information gathered and 
used by Google has been reported to be valued at $21.5 billion in 2018.64 
105. Further, participants in the auction who don’t place advertisements are 
incentivized to participate in the RTB auction solely to data mine consumer information in order 
to monetize that information.  
L. Plaintiffs’ personal information is property under California law 
106. Data or communications is considered property under California law because it is 
an intangible thing a person has a right to possess, use or enjoy. Google Customers have a 
property interest in their own data and personal information.  
107. The California Consumer Privacy Act permits businesses to purchase consumer 
information from consumers themselves, see Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(b)(1), and permits 
businesses to assess and appraise—i.e., to place a monetary value on—consumer data. See Cal. 
 
61 2019 Annual Report, Alphabet Inc. (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/1652044/000165204420000008/goog10-k2019.htm (hereinafter “2019 Annual 
Report”);2018 Annual Report. 
62 2019 Annual Report; 2018 Annual Report. 
63 2019 Annual Report. 
64 Robert Shapiro and Siddhartha Aneja, Who Owns Americans’ Personal Information and What 
Is It Worth?, Future Majority (April 2019), available at https://futuremajority.org/wp-
content/uploads/PersonalInfo.pdf. Shapiro is a Senior Policy Fellow at the Georgetown 
University McDonough School of Business and, among other past positions, served as the 
U.S. Under-Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs under President Clinton. 
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Civ. Code §1798.125(a)(2)). 
108. But for Google hiding how it was actually using Google Customers’ personal 
information the number of Google customers would have declined which would have hurt 
Google’s bottom line. Google avoided these costs by secretly robbing Google Customers of the 
value of their personal information.  
109. Google unlawfully and secretly diverted Google Customers’ personal information 
to realize billions in profits by misrepresenting what they were going to do with it, and how it 
was going to be disclosed. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and Google Customers were injured. 
M. The California Financial Privacy Act Imposes Information Fiduciary 
Obligations Upon Google 
110. For years, scholars have recognized that the law should recognize “information 
fiduciaries,”65 and have singled out the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) as 
legislation modeling how to impose such duties.66  
111. “An information fiduciary is a person or business who, because of their 
relationship with another, has taken on special duties with respect to the information they obtain 
in the course of the relationship.”67 Google is listed as a prime example of an information 
fiduciary.68 
112. “People and business entities act as information fiduciaries (1) when these people 
 
65 “[M]any online service providers and cloud companies who collect, analyze, use, sell, and 
distribute personal information should be seen as information fiduciaries toward their 
customers.” Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment (2016) 49 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1183, 1186. See also Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: 
Reinvigorating a Common Law Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J.F. 614, 628 (2018), 
https://www.yalelawjoumal.org/pdf/Solow-Niederman_qthw8784.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSR8-
32G2]; Matthew S. DeLuca, The Hunt for Privacy Harms After Spokeo, 86 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2439, 2460 (2018). 
66 “The proposed California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 is an interesting model for this kind 
of legislation” which would impose information fiduciary obligations on companies collecting 
consumer data. Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User 
Expectations (2018) 33 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1, 48.  
67 Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment (2016) 49 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1183, 1186. 
68 Id. 
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or entities hold themselves out to the public as privacy-respecting organizations in order to gain 
the trust of those who use them; (2) when these people or entities give individuals reason to 
believe that they will not disclose or misuse their personal information; and (3) when the affected 
individuals reasonably believe that these people or entities will not disclose or misuse their 
personal information based on existing social norms of reasonable behavior, existing patterns of 
practice, or other objective factors that reasonably justify their trust.”69 
113. In California, “[w]hether a fiduciary duty exists is generally a question of law. 
Whether the defendant breached that duty towards the plaintiff is a question of fact.” (Marzecv. 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 889, 915 [187Cal.Rptr.3d 452], 
internal citation omitted.).  
114. The CCPA imposes information fiduciary obligations on Google because it 
imposes special duties on Google with respect to the information it obtains in the course of a 
relationship with a user—namely, the CCPA requires Google to disclose how it uses consumer 
Personal Information.  Google “shall, at or before the point of collection, inform consumers as to 
the categories of personal information to be collected and the purposes for which the categories 
of personal information shall be used. A business shall not collect additional categories of 
personal information or use personal information collected for additional purposes without 
providing the consumer with notice consistent with this section.” Cal. Civ. Code, § 1798.100 
(emphasis added). 
115. Moreover, Google acts as an information fiduciary because it (1) holds itself out 
to the public as a privacy-respecting organization in order to gain the trust of those who use it; 
(2) gives individuals reason to believe that it will not disclose or misuse their personal 
information; and (3) Google’s consumers, including Plaintiff and Class Members, reasonably 
believe that Google will not disclose or misuse their personal information-based Google’s 
representations. 
116. Google has breached its information fiduciary obligations by misrepresenting how 
 
69 Id. at 1223–1224 
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it uses personal information of its consumers, in a manner that allows consumers to be tracked, 
monitored, surveilled, triangulated, and otherwise watched and manipulated, all without the 
consumer’s consent. 
V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
117. This is a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) (or, alternatively, 
23(c)(4)) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of: 
 
A Class of all persons residing in the United States with a Google 
Account who used the Internet using a Chrome browser on or after 
Google began using RTB in a manner that disclosed Google 
Customers’ personal information. 
118. Excluded from the Class are the Court, Defendant and its officers, directors, 
employees, affiliates, legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns, and any entity 
in which any of them have a controlling interest. 
119. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable. 
120. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and 
predominate over any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class. The questions 
of law and fact common to the Class include: 
a. Whether Google shared Google Customer personal information with 
others; 
b. Whether Google sold Google Customer personal information to others; 
c. Whether Google promised not to share personal information with others; 
d. Whether Google promised not to sell personal information to others; 
e. Whether Google was authorized to disclose Google Customer personal 
information to others; 
f. Whether Google was authorized to sell Google Customer personal 
information to others; 
g. Whether Google breached its contract with Google Customers; 
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h. Whether Google Customers’ Personal Information was improperly sold by 
Google; 
i. Whether Google was unjustly enriched by the unauthorized sales of 
Google Customers’ personal information; 
j. Whether Google’s actions would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person; 
k. Whether Google’s actions breached the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing; 
l. Whether Google’s actions violated the California Unfair Competition 
Law; 
m. Whether Google’s actions violated Article I, Section 1 of the California 
Constitution; 
n. Whether Google’s actions violated the California Invasion of Privacy Act; 
o. Whether Google’s actions violated the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act; 
p. Whether Google’s actions violated the Video Privacy Protection Act; 
q. Whether and the extent to which injunctive relief is appropriate. 
121. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of other Class Members, as all 
members of the Class were similarly affected by Google’s wrongful conduct in violation of 
federal and California law as complained of herein. 
122. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the 
Class and have retained counsel that is competent and experienced in class action litigation. 
Plaintiffs have no interest that conflicts with or is otherwise antagonistic to the interests of the 
other Class Members. 
123. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as 
the damages individual Class and Subclass members have suffered may be relatively small, the 
expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class and 
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Subclass to individually redress the wrongs done to them. 
124. There will be no difficulty in management of this action as a class action. 
VI. CAUSES OF ACTION 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY 
125. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 
126. Article I, § 1 of the California Constitution provides, “All people are by nature 
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among those are enjoying and defending life 
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, 
happiness, and privacy.” 
127. The phrase “and privacy” was added by an initiative adopted by California voters 
on November 7, 1972 (the Privacy Initiative). The Privacy Initiative created a private right of 
action against nongovernmental entities for invasions of privacy. 
128. The California Supreme Court has explained that, one of the principal “mischiefs” 
to which the Privacy Initiative was directed was “the overbroad collection and retention of 
unnecessary personal information by government and business interests.” White v. Davis, 13 
Cal.3d 757, 775 (Cal. 1975).  
129. Google’s conduct in selling and sharing Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal 
information violates its promises to the contrary.   
130. Google creates detailed dossiers of the personal information of Plaintiffs and 
Class Members, and then sells and shares it with numerous companies to profit and assist those 
other companies in creating their own separate dossiers about Plaintiffs and Class Members, 
from which those companies will further profit. 
131. Plaintiffs and Class Members have the right to privacy in their web-browsing 
history; in how their personal information is going to be used; in the right to withhold and not 
disclose their personal information, and all statutory privacy rights codified under federal and 
California law.  
132. Google has intruded on these privacy interests.  
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133. Through Google’s contracts and other statement, Google has promised not to 
share or sell Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal information without their agreement. 
134. Plaintiffs and Class Members had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Google 
affirmatively promised users it would not share or sell their personal information without 
authorization. 
135. Google’s actions constituted a serious invasion of privacy in that it violates 
several federal criminal laws, including the Electronic Communications Privacy Act; violates 
state criminal laws; violates the right to privacy located in the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution; invaded the privacy rights of hundreds of millions of Google Customers; 
disclosed sensitive personal information related to the verticals alleged above; facilitated the 
disclosure of Google Customers by third parties who did not have legal access to their personal 
information; and shared and sold personal information of hundreds of millions of Google 
Customers.  
136. Google lacked a legitimate business interest in sharing and selling Plaintiffs’ and 
Class Members’ personal information without their authorization. 
137. Google acted with oppression, fraud, or malice in invading Plaintiffs’ and Class 
Members’ privacy.  
138. Plaintiffs and Class Members have been damaged by Google’s invasion of their 
privacy and are entitled to just compensation in the form of actual damages, general damages, 
unjust enrichment, nominal damages, and punitive damages. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT 
139. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 
140. Google created a relationship of trust with Google Customers, such that Google 
Customers entrusted their personal information to Google.   
141. Google promised to not sell or share Google Customers, including Plaintiffs’ and 
Class Members’  personal information.  
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142.  Google promised to provide Plaintiffs and Class Members with services that did 
not compromise Google Customers’ personal information, rather than providing services that 
involved Google’s knowing sale and sharing of their customers’ personal information.  
143. Google violated its obligation to protect and keep private Plaintiffs’ and Class 
Members’ personal information by selling and sharing it to hundreds of companies. 
144. By doing do, Google breached its implied contracts with Plaintiffs and Class 
Members.  
145. Google’s failure to fulfill its obligations to honor its obligations to Google 
Customers resulted in Plaintiffs and Class Members receiving services that were of less value 
than they provided consideration for.  
146. Google’s failure to keep its promises resulted in Plaintiffs and Class Members 
suffering economic harm by losing the value of their personal information.  
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
147. Plaintiff brings this claim under the California Consumer Privacy Act.  
148. The California Consumer Privacy Act imposes information fiduciary obligations 
upon a business that collects a consumer’s personal information. That business “shall, at or 
before the point of collection, inform consumers as to the categories of personal information to 
be collected and the purposes for which the categories of personal information shall be used. A 
business shall not collect additional categories of personal information or use personal 
information collected for additional purposes without providing the consumer with notice 
consistent with this section.” Cal. Civ. Code, § 1798.100 (emphasis added). 
149. In light of the special relationship between Google and Plaintiffs and Class 
Members, whereby Google became guardian of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members' Personal 
Information, Google became an information fiduciary by its undertaking and guardianship of the 
Personal Information, to act primarily for the benefit of its consumers, including Plaintiff and 
Class Members, (1) for the safeguarding of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members' Personal Information; 
(2) to obtain consent for the sale or transmission of such Private Information; and (3) to respect 
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the choices regarding use or sale of the Plaintiffs and Class Members with respect to their 
Personal Information. 
150. Google has a fiduciary duty of confidentiality for the benefit of Plaintiffs and 
Class Members, in particular, to keep the Personal Information of its consumers as secure and 
confidential as it represents to its consumers. 
151. Google had information relating to Plaintiffs and Class Members that it knew or 
should have known was confidential. 
152. Google used Plaintiffs and Class Members’ Personal Information for its own 
benefit and/or communicated Plaintiffs and Class Members’ Personal Information to third parties 
in a manner that allowed them to be triangulated, identified, tracked, monitored, surveilled and 
manipulated in a manner Plaintiff and Class Members neither understood nor approved.  
153. Plaintiffs and Class Members did not give informed consent to Google’s  conduct. 
154. The Personal Information was not a matter of general knowledge.  
155. As a direct and proximate result of Google’s breaches of its fiduciary duties, 
Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered and will suffer injury, including but not limited to: 
(i) the compromise, publication, and/or theft of their Personal Information; (ii) the continued risk 
to their Personal Information, which remains in Google’s  possession and is subject to further 
unauthorized disclosures so long as Google fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures 
to protect the Personal Information in its continued possession; and (iii) future costs in terms of 
time, effort, and money that will be expended to secure such Personal Information. 
156. As a direct and proximate result of Google’s breaches of its fiduciary duties, 
Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury 
and/or harm, and other economic and non-economic losses. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
157. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein.  
158. Plaintiff brings this claim under the laws of California.  
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159. As a result of their unlawful conduct described above, Google has been unjustly 
enriched.  
160. Google has been unjustly enriched by the receipt of revenue in connection with 
the sale and sharing of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal information.  
161. Google has benefited from its unlawful acts and it would be inequitable for it to 
be permitted to retain any of its ill-gotten gains resulting from Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ 
use of its services. 
162. Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to the amount of Google’s ill-gotten 
gains resulting from their unlawful, unjust, and inequitable conduct. Plaintiffs and Class 
Members are entitled to the establishment of a constructive trust consisting of all ill-gotten gains 
from which Plaintiff and Class Members may make claims on a pro rata basis. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA UNFAIR 
COMPETITION LAW (“UCL”) 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. 
163. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein. 
164. Google is a “person” as defined by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17201. 
165. Google violated the UCL by engaging in unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business 
acts and practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 
166. Google violated the UCL by violating statutory laws as alleged in this Complaint.  
This includes, but not limited to, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 
and 2701, et seq.; the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710, et seq.; the California 
Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 630, et seq.; the California Computer Data Access 
and Fraud Act, and the Cal. Penal Code § 502. 
167. Google violated the UCL by violating constitutional and common laws as alleged 
in this Complaint.  This includes, but not limited to the common law right of privacy via 
intrusion upon seclusion and publication of private facts; the Art. 1, § 1 of the California 
Constitution Right to Privacy; express contract promises to consumers; the duty of good faith 
Case 5:21-cv-03360   Document 1   Filed 05/05/21   Page 38 of 65
 































and fair dealing; unjust enrichment; implied contract; and the duty to hold Google Customers’ 
personal information in confidence, and violating its TOS, knowingly and willfully or 
negligently and materially, in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22576 
168. Google violated the UCL by violating the unfair prong, as alleged in this 
Complaint.  This includes, but not limited to violating the spirit and letter of these laws, which 
protect property, economic and privacy interests, and prohibit unauthorized disclosure and 
collection of private communications and personal information; and stating it would not sell or 
disseminate Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal information without their consent to other 
companies. 
169. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ loss of their personal information constitutes an 
economic injury. 
170. Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered harm in the form of lost property 
value, specifically the diminution of the value of their private and personally identifiable data 
and content. 
171. Google’s actions caused damage to and loss of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ 
property right to control the use of their personal information and communications. 
172. Plaintiffs and Class Members seek all monetary and non-monetary relief allowed 
by law, including restitution, declaratory relief, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under 
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, injunctive relief, and all other equitable relief the 
Court determines is warranted. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
INTRUSON UPON SECLUSION 
173. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 
174. A claim for intrusion upon seclusion requires (1) intrusion into a private place, 
conversation, or matter; (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
175. Google intentionally intruded upon the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ solitude or 
seclusion by (1) monetizing Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal information without their 
consent, and (2) by mining and distributing data that they were not authorized to sell or share. 
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176. Google intentionally intruded upon the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ solitude or 
seclusion by facilitating cookie-matching with hundreds of other companies, as alleged herein. ,  
Cookie matching enabled companies with limited information about Plaintiffs and other Class 
Members to accumulate substantially more information about each individual Plaintiff and Class 
Member from Google. 
177. Google intentionally intruded upon the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ solitude or 
seclusion by selling and sharing Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ sensitive personal information 
for purposes of targeted advertising and publicized sensitive information to hundreds of other 
companies.  
178. None of Google’s actions were authorized by the Plaintiffs and Class Members. 
179. Google violated federal and state criminal and civil laws designed to protect 
individual privacy and against theft. 
180. It is highly offensive to a reasonable person that Google’s collected information 
on the Google Customer’s web browsing in order to sell and share it with hundreds of unknown 
companies without Google Customers’ consent.  It is also highly offensive that Google shared 
personal information from Google Customers regarding highly sensitive information, such as an 
individual’s race, ethnicity, religion, health, and financial status. 
181. It was highly offensive to a reasonable person for Google to intentionally intrude 
into Plaintiffs’ and Class Members personal information, Internet communications, and 
computing devices.  
182. Google has acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. 
183. Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to just compensation in the form of 
actual damages, general damages, unjust enrichment, nominal damages, and punitive damages 
under this cause of action. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION 
184. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 
185. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal information, including their sensitive 
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data and Internet communications, are private facts that Google promised not to share or sell to 
advertisers. 
186. Google publicized Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ private facts and the content of 
their Internet communications by sharing and selling them to hundreds of different companies. 
187. These companies profit from acquiring personal information and creating vast and 
rich dossiers to both target advertising and to further sell the personal information to other third 
parties.  
188. Plaintiffs and Class Members did not know that Google shared or sold their 
personal information and did not consent to such publication. 
189. It is highly offensive to a reasonable person that Google’s sold and shared 
personal information to hundreds of different advertising companies. 
190. Google acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. 
191. Plaintiffs and Class Members have been damaged by the publication of their 
private information and are entitled to just compensation in the form of actual damages, general 
damages, unjust enrichment, nominal damages, and punitive damages. 
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 
192. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 
193. Plaintiffs and Class Members gave their personal information to Google in trust.  
They trusted Google. 
194. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal information, including the content of 
their Internet communications, is confidential and novel. 
195. Google knew that Plaintiffs’ and Class Members trusted Google, and that their 
personal information was disclosed to Google in confidence. As alleged and incorporated herein, 
Google falsely represented in public statements by Google’s CEO and by representations made 
on its website that Google protected Plaintiffs and Class Members privacy, encouraged their 
trust, and promised them that Google would not sell their personal information, all showing that 
Google knew that their personal information was disclosed in confidence.  
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196. Google created a legal relationship with Plaintiffs and Class Members via its 
TOS, and created a duty to protect Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ confidential personal 
information. 
197. Plaintiffs and Class Members trusted Google. There was promise between Google 
and Class Members that Google would not betray their confidence by sharing their personal 
information without their agreement. 
198. Google breached the trust and confidence that Plaintiffs and Class Members 
placed in it by selling and sharing Google Customers’ personal information. 
199. Google acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. 
200. Plaintiffs and Class Members have been damaged by Google’s breach of trust and 
confidence and are entitled to just compensation in the form of actual damages, general damages, 
unjust enrichment, nominal damages, and punitive damages. 
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT 
201. Google, headquartered in California, is subject to the California Invasion of 
Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code §§ 630-638.  
202. Google is a “person” within the meaning of § 631(a) of the Cal. Penal Code. 
203. Google aided, agreed with, and conspired with Google RTB participants to aid 
them in reading, and/or or using the contents or meaning of the communications being 
exchanged connected to the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal information by employing 
the RTB auction to sell and share Google Customer information to hundreds of Google RTB 
participants in real-time while communications between the Google Customers and first-party 
websites were still in transit or being sent or received within California. 
204. Plaintiffs and Class Members did not consent to Google’s actions with Google 
RTB participants in reading and/ or using the contents or meaning of Plaintiffs’ and Class 
Members’ communications with websites that Plaintiffs and Class Members were directly 
interacting with. 
205. The cookies Google used; Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ browsers; personal 
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computing devices; Google’s web servers; the webservers of non-Google websites from which 
Google tracked, intercepted, shared, and sold the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ 
communications; and web servers of the Google RTB participants to which Google sold and 
shared Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ communications; and the computer code Google deployed 
to effectuate its scheme, including but  not limited to Bid Requests for each Consumer Google 
caused to be submitted to Google RTB participants all constitute “machine[s], instrument[s], or 
contrivance[s]” under § 631(a).  
206. Even if the above-listed items do not constitute “machine[s], instrument[s], or 
contrivance[s],” Google's deliberate and purposeful efforts to facilitate its conduct comprise “any 
other manner.” 
207. Google's aid to the Google RTB participants occurred   in “real time.” 
208. Google’s aid to Google RTB participants occurred while Plaintiffs’ and Class 
Members’ communications with first-party websites were in transit or in the process of being 
sent or received. 
209. Google’s RTB documentation concedes that the information Google aided RTB 
participants in reading included the “contents” and “meaning” of the Plaintiffs’ and Class 
Members’ communications with first-party websites.  
210. Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered loss by reason of these violations, 
including, but not limited to, violation of their rights to privacy and loss of value in their personal 
information. 
211. Plaintiffs and Class Members have a right to disgorgement and/or restitution 
damages for the value of the stolen data because taking Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal 
information without authorization is larceny under California law   
212. Because Plaintiffs and Class Members have been injured by Google’s violations 
of Cal. Pen. Code § 631, each seeks damages of the greater of $5,000 or three times the amount 
of actual damages, if any, sustained, as well as injunctive relief. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
VIOLATIONS OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT – 
UNAUTHORIZED INTERCEPTION, USE, AND DISCLOSURE 
213. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein. 
214. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) prohibits the  
unauthorized interception of the content of any communication through the use of any device, 
and any subsequent disclosure or use of the intercepted contents of any electronic 
communication. 18 U.S.C. §2511.  
215. ECPA protects both the sending and receipt of communications. 
216. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) provides a private right of action to any person whose wire, 
oral, or electronic communication is intercepted. 
217. Google violated the interception provisions of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (“ECPA”), by either “intentionally disclosing, or endeavoring to disclose, to other 
companies the contents of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ electronic communications,” 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c); and/or by “intentionally using, or endeavoring to use, the contents of 
Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ electronic communications” and/or U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c).  
218. ECPA defines interception as the “acquisition of the contents of any wire, 
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other 
device” and “contents . . . includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or 
meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4), (8). 
219. Google intercepted Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ electronic communications, 
including: 
a. The precise text of GET and POST requests that Plaintiffs and Class  
Members exchanged with non-Google websites to which they navigated; 
 
b. The precise text of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ search queries at non- 
Google websites to which they navigated and on which they entered such 
queries; and 
 
c. Information that is a general summary or informs Google (and the Google 
RTB participant) of the subject of communications between Plaintiffs and 
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Class members and the first-party websites. 
220. The transmission of data between Plaintiffs and Class Members and the non-
Google websites with which they chose to exchange communications are ''electronic 
communications" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). 
221. The ECPA defines content, when used with respect to electronic communications, 
to “include[] any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (emphasis added). 
222. Google’s developer documentation details the following content of electronic 
communications that it redirects to other companies in the Google RTB process: 
223. The ECPA defines “electronic, mechanical, or other device” as “any device . . . 
which can be used to intercept a[n] . . . electronic communication[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5). 
224. The following constitute devices within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5): 
 
a. The cookies Google used to acquire Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ 
communications, including cookies Google sets, acquires, and discloses or 
sells to other companies through cookie-sharing; 
 
b. The Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ browsers; 
 
c. The Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ computing devices; 
 
d. Google’s web servers; 
 
e. The web servers of the first-party non-Google websites from which 
Google tracked and intercepted the Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ 
communications; and 
 
f. The computer code deployed by Google to effectuate its tracking and 
interception of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ communications for 
purposes of forwarding them to hundreds of Google RTB participants, 
without authorization, including but not limited to data contained in Bid 
Requests. 
225. Google intentionally intercepted the contents of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ 
electronic communications for the unauthorized purpose of selling and sharing those contents to 
Google’s RTB participants. 
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226. Plaintiffs and Class members did not authorize Google to acquire the content of 
their communications for purposes of sharing and selling the personal information contained 
therein. Indeed, Google promised that it would not share or sell user personal information, 
including browsing history. 
227. Google’s interception of the contents of Plaintiffs’ and Class   Members’ 
communications was contemporaneous with their exchange with the websites to which they 
directed their communications. As described above, the Google RTB process occurs in 
milliseconds while the communication is still being exchanged between Plaintiffs and Class 
Members and the website to which they directed their communications. The signal sent out to 
Google RTB is sent simultaneously with the signal sent to the websites to which Plaintiffs’ and 
Class Members’ communications were directed. 
228. Google is not a party to Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ electronic 
communications exchanged with the non-Google websites to which Plaintiffs and Class 
Members directed their communications. 
229. Google acquired the content of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ electronic 
communications with the non-Google websites to which their communications were directed 
through the surreptitious duplication, forwarding, and re-direction of those communications to 
Google. After intercepting the communications without authorization, Google then sold and 
shared the contents of the intercepted communications to hundreds of Google RTB participants 
and used the contents of the intercepted communications in furtherance of the Google RTB 
auction. 
230. Google’s interceptions do not qualify for any exceptions under the ECPA. 
231. As alleged throughout, Google’s redirection, sale, and sharing of Plaintiffs’ and 
Class Members’ personal information and the contents of their Internet communications had the 
requisite criminal or tortious purpose for Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ claims for intrusion 
upon seclusion; publication of private facts; tortious violation of Art. I, sec. 1 of the California 
Constitution; breach of confidence; violation of the California UCL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 
17200; the California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code § 630; the California Computer 
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Data Access and Fraud Act, Cal. Penal Code § 502; California Statutory Larceny, Cal. Penal 
Code §§ 484 and 496; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511; and the 
Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710. 
232. For the violations set forth above, Plaintiffs and Class Members seek equitable or 
declaratory relief; statutory damages; punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a jury; 
and a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred. 18 U.S.C § 2520. 
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
VIOLATION OF ECPA WIRETAP AND STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT – 
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS  
(On Behalf of a Subclass Comprising All Google Customers Who Use Google Chrome) 
233. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein. 
234. Plaintiffs are Google Customers who also use the Google Chrome web browser. 
235. This count is brought on behalf of a subclass of all Google Customers who  
use the Google Chrome web browser. 
236. The Google Chrome Browser is an ECS. 
237. The ECPA Wiretap provision of the statute provides that “a person or entity 
providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the 
contents of any communication (other than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof) 
while in transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended 
recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(3)(a). 
238. The ECPA Stored Communication provision provides that “a person or entity 
providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any 
person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.” 18 
U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). 
239. Electronic Storage: The ECPA defines “electronic storage” as “any temporary, 
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic 
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transmission thereof” and “any storage of such communication by an electronic communication 
service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17). 
240. Google stores Plaintiffs’ and Subclass Members’ personal information and the 
contents of their communications in the Chrome browser and files associated with it. 
Specifically, Google stores the content of Plaintiffs’ and Subclass Members’ Internet 
communications within the Chrome browser in two ways: 
 
a. For purposes of backup protection so that if the browser inadvertently  
shuts down, Plaintiffs’ and Subclass Members’ can be presented with the option to 
restore their previous communications; and 
 
b. For a temporary and intermediate amount of time incidental to the 
electronic transmission thereof when it places the contents of user communications into 
the browser’s web-browsing history, which is only kept on the browser for 90 days. 
241. When a Google Customer clicks a button or hits ENTER to exchange a 
communication with the website the Google Customer is interacting with while using the 
Chrome browser, the content of the communication is immediately placed into storage within the 
Chrome browser. 
242. Google knowingly divulges the contents of Plaintiffs’ and Subclass’ members 
communications to hundreds of different companies through the Google RTB process while such 
communications are in electronic storage. 
243. Electronic Communication Service. An “electronic communication service” is 
defined as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or 
electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). 
244. The Google Chrome web browser is an electronic communication service. It 
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive electronic communications. In the absence 
of a web browser or some other such system, Internet users could not send or receive 
communications over the Internet. 
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245. Intentional Divulgence. Google intentionally designed the Chrome web browser 
so that it would divulge the contents of Plaintiffs’ and Subclass Members’ communications with 
non-Google websites to hundreds of Google RTB participants. 
246. While in Transmission. Google Chrome’s divulgence of the contents of 
Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ communications was contemporaneous with their exchange with 
the websites to which they directed their communications. As described above, the Google RTB 
process occurs in milliseconds while the communication is still being exchanged between 
Plaintiffs and Class Members and the websites to which they directed their communications. 
That is why Google itself refers to the process as “Real-Time Bidding.” The signal sent out to 
Google RTB is sent simultaneously with the signal sent to the websites to which Plaintiffs’ and 
Class Members’ communications were directed. 
247. Google Chrome is not a party to Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ electronic 
communications exchanged with the non-Google websites to which Plaintiffs and Class 
Members directed their communications. 
248. Google Chrome divulged the contents of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ 
electronic communications with the non-Google websites to which their communications were 
directed through the surreptitious duplication, forwarding, and re-direction of those 
communications to Google. The divulgence of the contents of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ 
communications was without authorization. Google Chrome divulged the contents of Plaintiffs’ 
and Class Members’ communications to hundreds of Google RTB participants, entities other 
than the intended recipient of such communication, while Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ 
communications were being transmitted on Google Chrome. 
249. Exceptions to Wire Tap Do Not Apply. In addition to the exception for 
communications directly to an ECS or an agent of an ECS, the Wiretap Act states that “[a] 
person or entity providing electronic communication service to the public may divulge the 
contents of any such communication”: 
a. “as otherwise authorized in section 2511(2)(a) or 2517 of this title;”  
 
b. “with the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or intended 
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 recipient of such communication;” 
 
c. “to a person employed or authorized, or whose facilities are used, to 
 forward such communication to its destination;” or 
 
d. “which were inadvertently obtained by the service provider and which  
appear to pertain to the commission of a crime, if such divulgence is made to a 
law enforcement agency.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b). 
250. Exceptions to Storage Do Not Apply. Section 2702(b) of the Stored 
Communications Act provides that an electronic communication service provider “may divulge 
the contents of a communication—” 
a. “to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent 
of such addressee or intended recipient;” 
 
b. “as otherwise authorized in section 2517, 2511(2)(a), or 2703 of this title;”  
 
c. “with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended 
recipient of such communication, or the subscriber in the case of remote computing 
service;” 
 
d. “to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used to 
forward such communication to its destination;” 
 
e. “as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the 
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service”: 
 
f. “to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in connection 
with a reported submitted thereto under section 2258A;” 
 
g. “to law enforcement agency, if the contents (i) were inadvertently  
obtained by the service provider; and (ii) appear to pertain to the     
commission of a crime;” 
 
h. “to a governmental entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes that an  
emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires 
disclosure without delay of communications relating to the emergency;” or 
 
i. “to a foreign government pursuant to an order from a foreign government  
that is subject to an executive agreement that the Attorney General has determined and 
certified to Congress satisfies section 2523.” 
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251. The hundreds of other companies to which Google divulges the content of  
252. Plaintiffs’ and Subclass Members’ communications while stored in Chrome are 
not “addressees,” “intended recipients,” or “agents” of any such addressees or intended recipients 
of the Plaintiffs’ and Subclass members’ communications. 
253. Sections 2517 and 2703 of the ECPA relate to investigations by government 
officials and have no relevance here. 
254. Section 2511(2)(a)(i) provides: 
  It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a 
switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or 
electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the 
transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, 
or use that communication in the normal course of his 
employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident 
to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the 
rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of 
wire communication service to the public shall not 
utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or 
service quality control checks. 
255. Google’s divulgence of the contents of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ 
communications on the Chrome browser to hundreds of Google RTB participants was not 
authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a) in that it was neither a necessary incident to the rendition 
of the Chrome service nor necessary to the protection of the rights or property of Google. 
256. Section 2517 of the ECPA relates to investigations by government officials and 
has no relevance here. 
257. Google’s divulgences of the contents of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ 
communications on the Chrome browser to hundreds of Google RTB participants was not done 
“with the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or intended recipient of such 
communication[s].” As alleged above, Plaintiffs and Class Members, including members of the 
Subclass, did not authorize Google to divulge the contents of their communications to hundreds 
of Google RTB participants. Nor, as alleged above, did Google procure the “lawful consent” of 
the websites to which Plaintiffs and Subclass Members directed and exchanged communications. 
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258. Wiretap: The other companies to which Google sold, shared, and divulged 
Plaintiffs’ and Subclass Members’ content of communications were not “person[s] employed or 
authorized, or whose facilities are used, to forward such communication[s] to [their] 
destination.” 
259. Storage: The hundreds of other companies to which Google divulges the content 
of Plaintiffs’ and Subclass Members’ communications while in Chrome storage through the RTB 
process are not “person[s] employed or whose facilities are used to forward such communication 
to its destination.” 
260. The contents of Plaintiffs’ and the Subclass Members’ communications did not 
appear to pertain to the commission of a crime, and Google Chrome did not divulge the contents 
of their communications to a law enforcement agency. 
261. Plaintiffs and the Subclass Members seek appropriate preliminary and other 
equitable or declaratory relief; the appropriate statutory measure of damages; punitive damages 
in an amount to be determined by a jury; and a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation 
costs reasonably incurred. 18 U.S.C. § 2520. 
TWELTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
VIOLATION OF THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 
(On Behalf of a Subclass Comprising All Google Customers Who Use Google Chrome, 
Android Operating System, or Apps that Incorporate the Google Software Development Kit) 
262. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein. 
263. The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (“VPPA”) provides that “a 
video tape service provider” shall not “knowingly disclose[], to any person, personally 
identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider” without informed written 
consent and not incident to the ordinary course of business. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). 
264. Video Tape Service Provider. Under the VPPA, a “video tape service provider” 
(“VTSP”) is “any person, engaged in the business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, 
of rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio-visual materials, 
or any person or other entity to whom a disclosure is made under subparagraph (D) or (E) of 
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subsection (b)(2), but only with respect to the information contained in the disclosure.” Under 
subparagraph (E) of subsection (b)(2), a VTSP is extended to include any person who obtains 
information “incident to the ordinary course of business of” the VTSP. As used in the VPPA, 
“‘ordinary course of business’ means only debt collection activities, order fulfillment, request 
processing, and transfer of ownership.” 
265. Google is a VTSP through its Chrome browser, Android operating system, and 
Google SDK that it provides to app developers. Google Chrome is engaged in the delivery of 
audio-visual materials similar to prerecorded video cassette tapes by providing software through 
which audio-visual materials are requested or obtained by Plaintiffs and Subclass Members from 
various first-party websites accessed via the Chrome browser. 
266. Google Android is engaged in the delivery of audio-visual materials similar to 
prerecorded video cassette tapes by providing software through which audio-visual materials are 
requested or obtained by Plaintiffs and Subclass Members at various first-party websites 
accessed via a mobile device running the Android operating system. 
267. The Google SDK is a provider of enterprise solutions for managing and 
monetizing customers’ video that is also a Google Ad Manager certified external vendor, to 
deliver video content to consumers, is engaged in the delivery of audio visual materials similar to 
prerecorded video cassette tapes by providing software through which audio visual materials are 
requested or obtained by Plaintiffs and Subclass Members at various first-party websites that 
make use of the Google SDK to provide such audio visual materials. 
268. Google Chrome, Android, and the Google SDK each also qualify as VTSPs 
through 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(E) because they are Google services that aid VTSPs in order 
fulfillment and request processing. 
269. Under the VPPA, “‘personally identifiable information’ includes information 
which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services 
from a” VTSP. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3). The VPPA definition of “personally identifiable 
information” is purposefully broad and open-ended. The VPPA “prohibits … [the disclosure of] 
‘personally identifiable information’ – information that links the customer or patron to particular 
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materials or services.” S. Rep. No. 100-599 at *7. "Unlike the other definitions [in the VPPA], 
paragraph (a)(3) uses the word ' includes' to establish a minimum, but not exclusive, definition of 
personally identifiable information." S. Rep. No. 100-599 at* 12. The Act was passed in 1988 
following publication of "a profile of Judge Robed H. Bork based on the titles of 146 files his 
family had rented from a video store." S. Rep. 100-599 at 6 (emphasis added). 
270. Google knowingly discloses personally identifiable information about Plaintiffs' 
and Subclass Members' requests, acquisitions, and viewing records of specific video materials 
and services. 
271. The Google RIB developer documentation for Bid Requests states that it 
discloses the following information about Plaintiffs and Subclass Members to hundreds of 
different companies, including regarding the audio-visual materials they access through Google 
Chrome, Android, and Google SDK: 
272. Many of the companies to which Google knowingly discloses Plaintiffs' and 
Class Members’ video purchases and viewing habits already maintain their own databases of 
identifiers for Plaintiffs and Class Members. Facebook is one of these companies.  
273. In addition, the identifiers Google discloses to the Google RTB participants are 
readily capable of being used by those companies to identify specific users even in the absence 
of a pre-existing database possessed by the recipient of Google’s disclosures.  
274. Certain types of disclosures are permitted under the VPPA. Establishing the 
existence of such circumstances is an affirmative defense. Regardless, none exists here. 
275. Google did not receive sufficient informed, written consent from Plaintiffs and 
Class Members to permit disclosure. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B). 
276. Disclosures were not made to law enforcement. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(C); see 18 
U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(F). 
277. Disclosures were not solely of the names and addresses of Plaintiffs and Class 
Members where they were provided a clear and conspicuous opportunity to prohibit the 
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disclosure and the disclosure did not disclose the title, description, or subject matter of any audio 
visual material. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D).70 
278. Disclosures were not incident to the ordinary course of business for Google 
Chrome, Android, or Google SDK. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(E). 
279. For Google’s VPPA violations, the Subclass who uses Google Chrome, the 
Android mobile operating system, or apps that incorporate the Google SDK seeks actual 
damages but no less than liquidated damages in an amount of $2,500; punitive damages; 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred; and such other 
preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c). 
THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
280. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 
281. Google’s relationship with its Google Customers is governed by the Google’s  
TOS and Privacy Policy. 
282. Since March 31, 2020, the Google TOS incorporated by reference the document 
titled “How our business works.” 
283. Through these documents, Google tells Google Customers, among other things, 
that “We don’t sell your personal information to anyone.” 
284. Since at least May 25, 2018, the Google Privacy Policy has also told Google 
Customers: “We don’t share information that personally identifies you with advertisers[.]”  
285. Moreover, since at least March 1, 2012, the Privacy Policy has promised, “We do 
not share your personal information with companies, organizations, or individuals outside of 
Google[.]” Prior to May 2018, Google Customers who created a Google Account were required 
to agree to both the TOS and the Privacy Policy. From May 2018 to March 31, 2020, while 
Google Customers were required to agree to only the TOS, the Google Account creation process 
 
70 While the subject matter may be disclosed for the exclusive use of marketing goods and 
services directly to the consumer, such disclosure remains conditioned on the consumer’s clear 
and conspicuous opportunity to prohibit such disclosure. Id. That opportunity was not made 
available to Plaintiffs and Class Members here.   
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included a link to the Privacy Policy as a guide to how Google would “process your 
information.” 
286. Google has breached and continues to breach its contractual promise to maintain 
the privacy of Google Customers’ personal information by selling and sharing Plaintiffs’ and 
Class Members’ personal information through Google RTB. 
287. As a result of Google’s breach of its contractual obligations, Google was able to 
obtain the personal property of Plaintiffs and Class Members and cause privacy injury and other 
consequential damages. 
288. Plaintiffs and Class Members did not receive the benefit of the bargain for which 
they contracted and for which they paid valuable consideration in the form of agreeing to share 
personal information. As alleged above, this personal information has ascertainable value to be 
proven at trial. 
289. As a result of Google’s breach of its contractual promises, Plaintiffs and Class 
Members are entitled to recover benefit of the bargain damages, unjust enrichment, and nominal 
damages. 
FOURTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF  
BREACH OF THE IMPLEIED COVENANT OF  
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
290. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 
291. Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and enforcement. 
292. The terms of Google’s contract with Google Customers supposedly respect and 
protect Google Customers’ privacy and promise not to sell or share their personal information. 
Google violated these contractual promises, and frustrated the purpose of those terms by selling 
and sharing Google Customers’ personal information. 
293. As alleged in the Factual Section of this Complaint, Google made statements 
concerning the supposed privacy of Google Customer personal information outside of the 
contractual terms.  By violating these extra-contractual terms and thereby acting in bad faith, 
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Google violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
294. Google’s failure to disclose to Plaintiffs and Class Members that it was sharing 
and selling their personal information was unreasonable and evaded the spirit of the bargain 
made between Google, Plaintiffs and Class Members. 
295. Google’s use of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal information to target 
them and enable other companies to add to their own user profiles was in bad faith, and 
promising Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal information would not be disclosed induced 
them to trust Google and share their personal information with Google. 
296. As a result of Google’s misconduct and breach of its duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, Google was able to obtain the valuable personal property of Plaintiffs and Class 
Members, earn unjust profits, and cause privacy injury and other consequential damages. 
297. As a result of Google’s bad faith breach of its contractual and extra-contractual 
promises, Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to recover benefit of the bargain damages, 
unjust enrichment damages in the form of restitution measures by either unearned profits or a 
reasonable royalty value, and nominal damages. 
FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
STATUTORY CIVIL LARCENCY  
California Penal Code Sections 484 and 496 
298. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 
299. Section 496(a) prohibits the obtaining of property “in any manner constituting 
theft.”  Section 484 thus defines “theft” to include obtaining property by false pretense. 
300.  Google intentionally created a platform that would operate in a manner hidden to 
Plaintiffs whose computers were thus deceived into providing PI to Google 
301. Google acted in a manner constituting theft and/or false pretense. 
302. Google stole, and/or fraudulently appropriated Plaintiffs’ personal information 
without Plaintiffs’ consent. 
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303. Google concealed, aided in the concealing, sold, and/or used Plaintiffs’ personal 
information that was obtained by Google for Google’s commercial purposes and the financial 
benefit of Google. 
304. Google knew that Plaintiffs’ personal was stolen because Google designed the 
script and code that tracked Plaintiffs’ personal and operated it in a manner that was concealed 
and/or withheld from Plaintiffs. 
305. The amount of damages is the market value of the unlawfully obtained personal 
data. 
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court: 
A. Award compensatory damages to Plaintiffs and the Class against Defendants for 
all the damages resulting from Defendant’s violations, in an amount to be proven at trial, 
including interest thereon; 
B. Award statutory damages in the amount to be proven at trial 
C. Award Plaintiffs and the Class damages due to unjust enrichment resulting from 
its violations identified herein, in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest thereon; 
D. Award Plaintiffs declaratory relief finding violations of the following causes of 
actions:  
 a. Google’s actions violated Art. 1, § 1 of the California Constitution, Right 
to Privacy; 
 b. Google’s actions constitute publication of private information; 
 c. Google’s actions constitute an intrusion upon seclusion 
 d.  Google’s actions violated California’s Invasion of Privacy Act; 
 f. Plaintiffs have suffered privacy and economic harm 
 g. Google’s actions violated the duty of confidence; 
 h. Google’s actions violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing; 
 i. Google’s actions violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act; 
 j. Google’s actions violated the Video Privacy Protection Act; 
 k Google breached the contractual rights of its users 
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l. Google’s actions violated California’s Unfair Competition Law;. 
E. Injunctive relief against Google, its officers, agents, servants, employees, and  
attorneys, from sharing or selling any existing account holder’s personal information without 
express authorization for the sale of such information; 
 F. Award Plaintiffs and the Class their reasonable fees, costs and expenses incurred 
in this action; 
G. Award Plaintiffs and the Class punitive damages pursuant to Cal.  Civ. Code § 
3294(a), as Google acted with oppression, fraud, or malic and 
H. Grant Plaintiffs such further relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
VII. JURY TRIAL DEMAND 





Dated:  May 5, 2021 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP 
 
 
By:       /s/ Nanci E. Nishimura  
NANCI E. NISHIMURA  
BRIAN DANITZ  
KARIN B. SWOPE  
NOORJAHAN RAHMAN  
BETHANY M. HILL  
 
KNOX RICKSEN LLP 
MAISIE C. SOKOLOVE  
THOMAS E. FRAYSSE  
ITAK K. MORADI  
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class 
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April 1, 2021 
 
Sundar Pichai 
Chief Executive Officer 
Google LLC 
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 
Mountain View, CA 94043 
 
Dear Mr. Pichai: 
 
We write to seek information about your company’s sharing of Americans’ personal data 
in order to understand how that information may be obtained and exploited by foreign 
governments to the detriment of our national security. 
  
Many of the ads we see on our phones, computers, and smart TVs are curated through a 
process called real time bidding. In the milliseconds before digital ads are displayed, an 
auction takes place in which hundreds of companies are able to bid for their ad to be 
shown. While only one company will win the auction, hundreds of firms participating 
receive sensitive information about the potential recipient of the ad—device identifiers 
and cookies, web browsing and location data, IP addresses, and unique demographic 
information such as age and gender. Your company operates a major advertising auction 
service. 
  
Few Americans realize that some auction participants are siphoning off and storing 
“bidstream” data to compile exhaustive dossiers about them. In turn, these dossiers are 
being openly sold to anyone with a credit card, including to hedge funds, political 
campaigns, and even to governments. 
  
Over the past year, multiple reports have indicated that a number of federal agencies have 
purchased personal data derived from mobile apps and other online services, in ways that 
potentially merit closer scrutiny. But the United States is not the only government with 
the means and interest in acquiring Americans’ personal data. This information would be 
a goldmine for foreign intelligence services that could exploit it to inform and 
supercharge hacking, blackmail, and influence campaigns. As Congress debates potential 
federal privacy legislation, we must understand the serious national security risks posed 
by the unrestricted sale of Americans’ data to foreign companies and governments. To 
that end, please provide us with answers to the following questions by May 4, 2021: 
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1. Please identify the specific data elements about users, their devices, the websites 
they are accessing, and apps they are using that you provide to auction 
participants. 
2. Please identify each company, foreign or domestic, to whom your firm has 
provided bidstream data in the past three years that is not contractually prohibited 
from sharing, selling, or using the data for any purpose unrelated to bidding on and 
delivering an ad. 
3. If your firm has contractual restrictions in place prohibiting the sharing, sale, or 
secondary use of bidstream data, please detail all efforts to audit compliance with 
these contractual restrictions and the results of those audits. 
4. Please identify each foreign-headquartered or foreign-majority owned company to 
whom your firm has provided bidstream data from users in the United States and 
their devices in the past three years. 
  
Thank you for your attention to this important matter. 
  




                 
Ron Wyden      Bill Cassidy, M.D. 
United States Senator    United States Senator 
 
 
                 
Kirsten Gillibrand     Mark R. Warner 
United States Senator    United States Senator 
 
 
                 
Sherrod Brown     Elizabeth Warren 
United States Senator    United States Senator 
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cttongress of tbe Wntteb ~tates 
miafi'bington, tll<tt 20515 
July 31, 2020 
The Honorable Joseph J. Simons 
Chairman 
Federal Trade Commission 
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20580 
Dear Chairman Simons: 
We write to urge the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to investigate widespread privacy 
violations by companies in the advertising technology (adtech) industry that are selling private 
data about millions of Americans, collected without their knowledge or consent from their 
phones, computers, and smart TVs. 
In response to complaints by privacy advocates, privacy regulators in several European countries 
have, over the last year, opened investigations into an adtech practice known as real time bidding 
(RTB). RTB is the process by which the digital ads we see every day are curated. For each ad, an 
auction takes place milliseconds before it is shown in an app or browser. The hundreds of 
participants in these auctions receive sensitive information about the potential recipient of the 
ad-device identifiers and cookies, location data, IP addresses, and unique demographic and 
biometric information such as age and gender. Hundreds of potential bidders receive this 
information, even though only one- the auction winner-will use it to deliver an advertisement. 
Few Americans realize that companies are siphoning off and storing that "bidstream" data to 
compile exhaustive dossiers about them. These dossiers include their web browsing, location, 
and other data, which are then sold by data brokers to hedge funds, political campaigns, and even 
to the government without court orders. 
Unregulated data brokers have access to bidstream data and are using it in outrageous ways that 
violate Americans' privacy. For example, media reports recently revealed that Mobilewalla, a 
data broker and a buyer of bidstream data, used location and inferred race data to profile 
participants in recent Black Lives Matter protests. Moreover, Mobilewalla's CEO revealed, in a 
podcast recorded in 201 7, that his company tracked Americans who visited places of worship 
and then built religious profiles based on that information. 
The identity of the companies that are selling bidstream data to Mobilewalla and countless other 
data brokers remains unknown. However, according to major publishers, companies are 
participating in RTB auctions solely to siphon off bidstream data, without ever intending to win 
the auction and deliver an ad. In a June 16, 2020, open letter of concern to the digital advertising 
industry, a group of major publishers, whose websites and apps supply the bidstream data to the 
RTB industry, wrote that "the current system allows for a significant data breach by companies 
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gaining access to the real-time bidding (RTB) infrastructure (i.e. the 'bid stream') for the sole 
purpose of harvesting both publisher-specific and audience-specific data." 
Americans never agreed to be tracked and have their sensitive information sold to anyone with a 
checkbook. Furthermore, there is no effective way to control these tools absent intervention by 
regulators and Congress. Technological roadblocks, such as browser privacy settings and ad 
blockers, are routinely circumvented by advertising companies. This outrageous privacy 
violation must be stopped and the companies that are trafficking in Americans' illicitly obtained 
private data should be shut down. Accordingly, we urge the FTC to use its authority to conduct 
broad industry probes under Section 6(b) of the FTC Act to determine whether adtech companies 
and their data broker partners have violated federal laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive 
business practices. The FTC should not proceed with its review of the Children's Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPP A) Rule before it has completed this investigation. 
We appreciate your attention to this important matter. 
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Sincerely, 
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Bill Cassidy, M.D. 
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Ro Khanna 
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